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1

Introduction
Research universities have traditionally been catalysts for technological

innovation, particularly in new and emerging industries. A recent report on the
management of university intellectual property confirms this historical role, stating that
universities “have a lengthy track record of providing dynamic environments for
generating new ideas and spurring innovation, and for moving advances in knowledge
and technology into the commercial stream where they can be put to work for the public
good.”1 Products ranging from the Gatorade® sports drink to the polymerase chain
reaction (PCR) gene sequencing technology have emerged from university laboratories.
University-based research played a major role in the growth of the early biotechnology
industry and has made notable contributions to industries such as computer software,
medical devices and the Internet.2 In the United States, universities and other research
institutions spent over $53 billion on research in 20093 and, of the top fifty holders of
U.S. patents in the “biotech and pharma” field, in 2009 seven were U.S. universities and
eight more were U.S. and non-U.S. governmental or quasi-governmental research
institutions.4
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that some of the most promising new
technologies relating to climate change are being developed at research universities.5 A
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growing number of universities, both in the U.S. and internationally, have established
patent positions in climate change technologies such as solar energy, wind power and
biofuels.6 Several U.S. universities have initiated ambitious “clean tech” programs that
combine academic research with industrial partnerships, business formation and policy
analysis.7 The Global Climate & Energy Project at Stanford University, for example,
supports 66 different research programs at 27 institutions worldwide.8 The
Massachusetts Institute of Technology sponsors an annual competition that awards
$200,000 to the most promising clean energy venture in the country and has fostered the
creation of numerous spin-out companies in the climate change technologies space.9 And
Washington University in St. Louis has partnered with twenty-five leading academic
institutions across the world to form the McDonnell Academy Global Energy and
Environmental Partnership (MAGEEP) to fund collaborative research projects in clean
tech fields as diverse as aerosol science, solar energy, bioenergy, water quality and
building energy consumption. It is likely that university initiatives such as these will
proliferate as the need for viable renewable energy sources and climate change
technologies continues to escalate.
In this chapter, we first summarize several modes of university technology
development and licensing. Next we describe the evolution of university technology
commercialization and the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which is widely credited with
establishing the intellectual property structure of current university licensing and
technology transfer. We then discuss some important legal and intellectual property
considerations relevant to the development, commercialization and licensing of university
technology. While this treatment is necessarily brief, we hope that it may serve as a
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useful tool both to those who are considering collaborating with, or licensing technology
from, a research university, and to university researchers who are contemplating the path
to commercializing their climate change technology innovations.

2

Modes of University Research and Technology Transfer
University-based research in climate change technologies takes place in a variety

of funding and collaboration structures. The particular structure governing a research
project will have a significant impact on the intellectual property rights and technology
transfer procedures applicable to that project. In this Section we outline several common
modes of university research funding and technology transfer that are prevalent in the
United States today. Funding organizations should be aware of the norms and structures
of university research as described in this and subsequent Sections when deciding if
funding university research will adequately promote their policy and intellectual property
goals. Additionally, those interested in licensing climate change technologies should also
be aware of the norms and structures of university research as these will effect the
licensing terms under which the licensor can utilize the technology.
2.1

Grant Funding. The U.S. federal government funds between 62% and

68% of university research in the United States, primarily through grant mechanisms.10
Federal grants are typically awarded and administered by executive branch agencies such
as the National Institutes of Health (NIH), Department of Energy (DOE), Department of
Defense (DOD), National Air and Space Administration (NASA), National Science
Foundation (NSF) and Department of Agriculture (USDA). As there is currently no
single agency responsible for overseeing climate change technology in the U.S., funding
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is distributed among these and other agencies, with the majority contributed by DOE and
NASA. Between 1998 and 2009, federal appropriations for climate change research
totaled approximately $99 billion, more than $35 billion of which was appropriated in
2009 alone.11 While this funding is not directed exclusively to universities, university
researchers are the beneficiaries of substantial grant funding relating to climate change.
2.2

Industry Sponsorship. In addition to federal grant funding, a significant

portion of university research is supported by private industry. In 2008, private industry
provided over $2.5 billion in funding for academic scientific research.12 Such support
can take two basic forms: general support and sponsored research. General support
consists of unrestricted or earmarked contributions by industry to particular universities
or research programs. Under such a model, the corporate donor, while likely obtaining
public relations and other intangible benefits, typically does not gain the right to direct or
commercially exploit the results of the university’s research. ExxonMobil Corporation’s
$100 million contribution to Stanford’s Global Climate & Energy Project falls into this
general category.13
Sponsored research, on the other hand, is more akin to a contracted research
arrangement between the university and the corporate sponsor. The sponsor funds the
university’s conduct of a specific research project, sometimes in collaboration with the
sponsor’s own scientists, and typically obtains the right, or an option to license the right,
to commercialize the resulting technology. Sponsored research arrangements are not
uncommon, particularly in the life sciences. One study found that in 2000, 28% of
university faculty in the life sciences received funding from private sponsors.14 These
arrangements, however, must be structured carefully to avoid disputes regarding
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inventorship and ownership of discoveries. In one recent case, Vanderbilt University
scientists were held not to be co-inventors on a patent covering the blockbuster drug
Cialis, which they helped to develop under a sponsored research agreement with Glaxo.15
2.3

Licensing and Technology Transfer. Though significant research activity

is undertaken at universities, their educational and research missions do not typically
permit them to engage actively in commercial activity. Thus, in order to put university
research to commercial use, universities must license or transfer technology to the private
sector. To do this, most universities have established technology licensing offices
(TLOs) responsible for evaluating the commercial promise of each new university
invention, making decisions regarding patenting, identifying appropriate commercial
partners, negotiating suitable license and option agreements, and then distributing the
resulting royalties and other economic gains within the university.16 After deducting the
TLO’s overhead, patenting costs, and the like, most universities allocate royalties in
varying percentages among the responsible inventors, their academic departments, and
the university at large.
In recent years, TLOs have displayed considerable activity. Data from a survey
conducted by the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) indicates
that, in fiscal year 2009, 4,374 licenses were executed by responding university TLOs.17
During this period, 8,364 new U.S. patent applications were filed by these TLOs.18
Evidence indicates that 50% to 75% of TLO patenting and licensing activity falls within
the biosciences and pharmaceutical fields, as opposed to fields such as software and
electronics which account for less than 10% each.19 It is unclear whether TLOs will
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respond to climate change technologies with aggressive patenting and licensing as is
observed in the biosciences field.
While most universities, including research powerhouses such as Stanford, MIT
and Harvard, operate their TLOs as internal groups, sometimes falling under the
jurisdiction of the university counsel or the office of the provost and sometimes operating
semi-autonomously, others have elected to establish independent entities to manage
intellectual property emerging from university labs.20 The most notable of these is the
University of Wisconsin-Madison, whose Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation
(WARF) was established in 1925.21 WARF granted its first commercial license to the
Quaker Oats Company in 1928 for a Vitamin D supplement developed to combat the
childhood disease rickets.22 Today, WARF enters into approximately one hundred
commercial licensing agreements per year and has contributed nearly $1 billion in net
revenue to the university.23
2.4

Spin-Outs. In many cases, the most likely industrial licensee of a

university invention is an established enterprise actively pursuing the development of
products in the relevant field. Sometimes, however, established industrial partners may
not exist, particularly when technologies are in new and emerging fields. In these cases,
university researchers, working with external advisors and funders, may form start-up
companies to commercialize the discoveries generated by their labs. According to
AUTM survey data, 596 start-up companies were formed based on university-owned
intellectual property in 2009, up from 241 start-up companies in 1994.24 These
companies are referred to as university “spin-outs”, and AUTM reports that in 2008,
more than 16% of university technology licenses were granted to such start-up
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companies.25 In addition to licenses of university intellectual property, such spin-outs
often make use of university-owned facilities and equipment, as well as the services of
academics, technicians and graduate students. University spin-outs have attracted
significant public attention in recent years, both due to the phenomenal success of a
handful of such ventures26 and the potential conflicts of interest that plague academic
investigators who actively participate in corporate research.27 Spin-out activity has been
particularly notable in the field of climate change technology, with the emergence of
high-profile companies such as A123 Systems (MIT – lithium ion batteries), SunPower
(Stanford – solar energy) and Verenium (Univ. Fla – cellulosic ethanol), as well as a
myriad of smaller ventures.28
2.5

Patent Pools and Commons. When multiple entities each hold patents

necessary to exploit a single technology, a situation referred to as patent “stacking”, or a
patent “thicket” or anti-commons, may be said to exist.29 In order for a producer to
implement the technology in a product, it must obtain licenses from multiple parties, each
acting independently and each seeking to maximize its gains. The sum of these
individual demands may be excessive in relation to the overall value of the product being
produced. In order to address patent stacking concerns, groups of patent holders
sometimes aggregate their essential patents into so-called patent pools, which are licensed
and administered on a collective basis. Well-known patent pools exist in the areas of
consumer electronics and digital media, and Columbia University is one of the original
patent holders in the large pool responsible for licensing use of the ubiquitous MP3 data
compression standard. The formation of patent pools is complex and involves the
application of antitrust analysis well beyond the scope of this chapter.30
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A close relative of the patent pool is the patent commons, in which participants
voluntarily commit not to assert patents relevant to a specific field, subject to certain
conditions. One such effort that is gaining significant attention in the area of climate
change is the Eco-Patent Commons, in which a number of global corporations including
IBM, Sony, Fuji Xerox, Nokia, Dow Chemical and DuPont have pledged to make
environmentally-beneficial inventions available to the public on a royalty-free basis.31
The Eco-Patent Commons is organized under the auspices of the Geneva-based World
Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD).32

3

University Research and the Bayh-Dole Act
Due to the dominance of federal funding of university research, inventors and

investors interested in climate change technologies must understand the regulations
surrounding the dissemination of federally funded research. In this Section we discuss
specific practical, legal and intellectual property considerations that arise in the context of
the federal funding described in Section 2.1.
3.1

A Brief History. Until World War II, university research in the U.S.

tended toward the theoretical and received relatively modest governmental support.33
With the advent of the Manhattan Project, however, federal funding for research, and
applied research in particular, increased dramatically.34 In the decades that followed,
numerous federal agencies began to fund university research; today the majority of
university research is funded by the federal government, which contributed more than
$32 billion to the research budgets of universities and non-profit research institutions in
2008.35
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Prior to 1980, rights in federally-funded inventions were governed by the rules of
individual funding agencies and often inured to the agencies themselves.36 Yet the
federal government rarely put these inventions to commercial use, it being estimated that
of the 30,000 federally-owned patents in existence prior to 1980, only five percent were
ever licensed to industry and even fewer used in commercial products or services.37 In
response to this perceived underutilization of federally-funded research, the Bayh-Dole
Act38 was enacted in 1980. The purpose of the Act was to provide a consistent patent
policy in regards to federally funded research and to promote the commercialization of
resultant technologies.39 The Act effected a major change in U.S. policy by allowing
universities, small businesses and other research institutions to retain ownership of
inventions resulting from federally funded research. In exchange for this grant of
ownership, the Act requires these entities to apply for patent protection in the U.S. and
abroad and imposes penalties for failing to take effective steps to achieve “practical
application” of the inventions.40
3.2

Requirements of the Bayh-Dole Act. In exchange for giving universities

the right to retain ownership of their federally-funded inventions, the Bayh-Dole Act
imposes a number of obligations. Given the pervasiveness and magnitude of federal
research funding in the U.S., most universities have incorporated the requirements of the
Act into their standard technology development and licensing practices. The principal
among these are described below.
3.2.1

Invention Disclosure. The Act and its implementing regulations

require that each federally-funded institution disclose to the relevant funding agency each
invention reduced to practice within two months after it becomes known to the
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institution’s patent administration personnel.41 In order to support this obligation, each
institution is also required to implement written agreements with its technical personnel
(including faculty, technicians and students) requiring them to disclose all such
inventions to the TLO.42 Typically such agreements, which may be implemented in
signed contracts or binding policy documents, also include an explicit assignment of
intellectual property rights from the inventor to the university.43
Each university TLO submits invention disclosures to the applicable funding
agencies, typically through the federal government’s iEdison interagency web-based
system, which accepts submissions for eighteen different federal agencies.44 Invention
disclosures and other information submitted to a federal agency pursuant to the BayhDole Act are treated as privileged and confidential and are not disclosed outside of the
agency.45
A university’s failure to comply with the disclosure requirements of the Act can
result in the government’s receiving title to the relevant invention.46 In at least two
litigated cases, courts have prohibited institutions from enforcing patents following a
failure to comply with the disclosure requirements of the Bayh-Dole Act on the basis that
the plaintiffs never acquired title to the patents in suit.47 However, even in cases in which
the government receives title to a federally-funded invention, the university retains a nonexclusive, royalty-free, worldwide license to exploit such invention.48
3.2.2

Patent Election. A university may elect to retain title to any

invention disclosed to the federal government within two years of making such
disclosure.49 If the university elects to retain title, it must file a patent application
covering that invention in the U.S. prior to the expiration of any statutory bar date, and in
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any other countries in which it elects to retain title.50 If it fails to make such filings, the
government may receive title to the relevant invention.51
This is not to say, however, that universities file patent applications covering
every invention that is disclosed by their researchers. In fact, according to AUTM, over
20,000 invention disclosures were filed across all U.S. research universities in 2009,
whereas less than 8,400 new U.S. patent applications were filed in the same year.52 In
many cases, the potential commercial value of an invention may be small and the
university’s educational and research missions may better be achieved by permitting the
researcher to publish the relevant findings and/or to release the invention, for example, on
an “open source” basis. If a university wishes to discontinue prosecuting a patent
application or maintaining a patent that was developed using federal funding, it must so
notify the federal agency.53 While such a notification technically gives the government
the right to receive ownership of the invention, in practice governmental agencies rarely
exercise this right.
A related issue concerns a university’s right to an invention under the Bayh-Dole
Act when an investigator purports to assign the rights in that invention to a commercial
research sponsor. The issue recently arose when a Stanford University researcher, Mark
Holodny, entered into a sponsored research agreement with Cetus Corporation (now part
of Roche).54 Under the agreement, the researcher assigned his rights in an invention
pertaining to AIDS therapy to Cetus in violation of Stanford’s intellectual property policy
and his agreement with Stanford. When Stanford subsequently sued Cetus for
infringement of the resulting patent, the Federal Circuit held that Stanford lacked
standing to sue, as the invention had previously been assigned to Cetus.55 The Supreme
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Court recently granted certiorari to consider the question of whether the patent
ownership provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act pre-empt private assignments such as that
effected by Dr. Holodny.56
3.2.3

Government Rights. In addition to the right to receive ownership

of inventions as described above, the federal government retains several additional rights
in federally-funded inventions. First, it retains a non-exclusive, paid-up license to
practice, or have practiced, any such invention for or on behalf of the United States
anywhere in the world.57 Second, the government may exercise so-called “march in”
rights under which it may compel a university to license an invention to one or more third
parties if necessary to alleviate health or safety needs, if the university has not taken
effective steps toward the commercialization of the invention, or if the U.S.
manufacturing requirements described below are violated.58
In practice, the federal government has never exercised its march-in rights under
the Act, though there have been several instances in which third parties have petitioned
federal granting agencies to exercise those rights. The first instance occurred in 1997
when CellPro, Inc. petitioned the NIH to exercise march-in rights against Johns Hopkins
University.59 CellPro’s goal was to obtain a license to four patents that Johns Hopkins
had previously licensed exclusively to Baxter Healthcare. The NIH determined that the
exercise of march-in rights was not warranted because Baxter Healthcare had used
reasonable efforts to make a product manufactured under the patents available.60 In
2004, two individuals petitioned the NIH to exercise march-in rights against Abbott
Laboratories, which had received NIH funding to develop the AIDS drug Norvir, after
Abbott increased the retail price of the drug by approximately 400%.61 Again, the NIH

12

determined that the patentee had used the requisite efforts to achieve practical application
of the federally-funded invention, and further commented that the exercise of march-in
rights “is not an appropriate means of controlling prices.”62
Another request for the exercise of march-in rights was made to the Dept. of
Health and Human Services with respect to the drug Fabrazyme, which is used to treat
the rare disorder Fabry’s Disease. Fabryzyme was created in part with NIH grant funding
and is currently the only FDA-approved treatment for Fabry’s Disease.63 The
manufacturer of Fabryzyme, Genzyme, was forced to shut down its primary Fabryzyme
manufacturing line due to contamination, which resulted in shortages of the drug and
rationing to patients since June of 2009.64 Fabry’s Disease patients subsequently filed a
petition with the Dept. of Health and Human Services petitioning the federal government
to exercise its march-in rights to allow an alternative manufacturer to produce the
compound.65 NIH denied the petition, however, reasoning that any alternative
manufacturer would face subtantial and time-consuming regulatory hurdles that would
not soon result in an increased supply of the drug.66 It has been reported that the
petitioners intend to appeal this decision.67
3.2.4

U.S. Manufacturing. The Bayh-Dole Act prohibits the owner of an

invention made using federal funding from exclusively licensing the use of that invention
in the United States unless the licensee agrees that all products embodying the invention,
or produced through use of the invention, will be manufactured substantially in the
United States.68 This provision is essentially a “Buy American” initiative intended to
promote U.S. industry and has been criticized as outdated in today’s global economy.69
The U.S. manufacturing requirement may be waived by the funding agency if domestic
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manufacture is not “commercially feasible” or if efforts to identify U.S. manufacturers
have been unsuccessful.
3.2.5

Non-Assignment. The Act expressly prohibits universities from

assigning rights in federally-funded inventions to third parties without the approval of the
funding agency.70 An exception is made only for assignments to patent management
entities such as University of Wisconsin-Madison’s WARF. This restriction often causes
confusion among inexperienced venture capitalists and angel investors who argue,
sometimes vociferously, that university spin-out companies should obtain full ownership,
rather than a mere license, of the fundamental patents underlying their business. This
perception is also widely shared by non-U.S. investors, who are accustomed to dealing
with non-U.S. university spin-outs, which are typically not subject to non-assignment
prohibitions under local legislation.
3.2.6

Royalty-Sharing. The division of economic returns from

university technology is typically handled internally by the university through its TLO.
The Bayh-Dole Act requires only that universities share royalties with individual
inventors, without specifying the level or form of such sharing, and that the balance of
these proceeds (after payment of expenses), “be utilized for the support of scientific
research or education.”71 Royalty sharing arrangements vary widely among institutions.
For example, Stanford University allocates the first 15% of net license revenue (after
patenting costs) to its TLO, then splits the remaining 85% in three equal parts among the
inventors (in equal shares), their departments, and the university; Washington University
in St. Louis allocates 25% to its TLO, 35% to the inventors and 40% to the university;
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and Rice University allocates 37.5% to the inventors, 14% to their departments, 18.5% to
the graduate education function, and 30% to the university.72
While these arrangements are typically invisible to licensees, they become
particularly important in arrangements involving collaboration by researchers at two or
more universities. In such settings, institutions are often sensitive to perceived unequal
treatment of collaborating researchers and must adjust their revenue sharing policies to
account for differing expectations.
3.3

Accolades and Criticisms. The Bayh-Dole Act and the university

technology transfer structure it formed has generated numerous accolades and criticisms.
Proponents of the Act contend that its encouragement of the patenting and licensing of
federally-funded research has provided an effective framework for federal technology
transfer, yielding economic benefits not just for universities and private industry, but for
the U.S. economy as a whole.73 A 2002 article in the Economist famously referred to the
Bayh-Dole Act as “possibly the most inspired piece of legislation to be enacted in
America over the past half-century”.74 The Biotechnology Industry Organization
reported that, in the period from 1996 to 2007, university licensing to industry created
over 279,000 jobs and contributed to over $457 billion in industry output.75 According to
the former president of the Association of University Technology Managers, during the
years 2000 to 2008 universities signed 41,598 license and option agreements with
industry and filed 83,988 patent applications.76
Despite these glowing numbers, critics of the Act argue that the technology
transfer system is inefficient and detrimental to the mission and norms of university
research.77 Relatively few of the patent applications filed by universities resulted in
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licensing agreements with industry, and fewer still resulted in large revenues, with only
0.5% of licensing agreements over the last 20 years exceeding $1 million in royalty
income.78 In 2005, only 25 universities reported more than $10 million in licensing
revenue, a small amount in comparison to the research expenditures at many
universities.79 For most universities, revenue from licensing barely covers the cost of
staff and legal expenses associated with the process.80 Furthermore, some critics contend
that the race to patent university research, and the revenue generated by university-owned
patents, has caused many universities to shift their focus from basic research to
commercial development.81 This shift, they argue, has led to a reduction in nonremunerative basic research, a stifling of the free flow of ideas that previously
characterized scientific inquiry, and an inappropriate linkage, if not an outright conflict of
interest, that afflicts not only academic institutions but also individual investigators who
stand to gain substantial financial rewards from the commercial exploitation of their
laboratory research.82
To-date, there is little definitive empirical evidence supporting either position.83
Indisputable, however, is the fact that universities continue to develop innovations across
a broad range of technologies, to obtain patent protection for those innovations
(approximately 4,000 U.S. patents per year)84 and to license those patents to the private
sector for commercial application.

4

Other University Policy Considerations
Despite the frequent appearance of universities in the modern R&D landscape,

universities are fundamentally different than corporate technology developers.
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Universities operate on a not-for-profit basis, their missions are directed primarily toward
research and education, and they are populated largely by academics, scientists and
students. These unique characteristics distinguish university-based climate change
technology development and exploitation and result in policies and practices that are
significantly different than those found in commercial settings.

4.1

The Research Exemption.
4.1.1

A Narrow(ed) Exemption. A university’s ability to carry on

research freely and without impediment is fundamental to its mission. A decade ago it
was widely believed that academic research in the U.S. could be conducted without threat
of patent infringement on the basis that pure research does not infringe the exclusive
rights of a patent holder (i.e., the rights to make, use and sell a patented article and to
perform a patented process).85 This assumption was severely undermined by the Federal
Circuit’s 2002 decision in Madey v. Duke University.86 In that case Professor Madey, a
senior academic researcher, sued Duke, his former employer, for infringing several
patents that Madey held in his own name. The alleged infringement involved Duke’s
continuing use of experimental laser equipment developed by Madey during and before
his tenure at Duke. Duke asserted, among other things, that its use of the equipment had
no commercial application and was directed solely to its non-profit research mission.
The court, while recognizing a limited judicial “experimental use” exemption from patent
infringement, held that this exemption should be interpreted narrowly to exclude from
infringement only activities that are carried out “for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity,
or for strictly philosophical inquiry.”87 Duke, it held, did not meet this standard, as its

17

research was intended to further institutional business objectives such as educating
students, improving its academic standing and attracting research grants, students and
faculty.88 As numerous commentators have observed, the Madey court’s narrow reading
of the experimental use exemption effectively eliminates its use in all but the most
extreme cases, and does little to protect the research activities of any modern research
university.89
4.1.2

The Limited Reach of Madey. It is worth noting two significant

categories of institutions to which the Federal Circuit’s narrow experimental use
exemption does not apply. First, due to the territorial nature of patent law, the Madey
decision only applies in the United States. Other jurisdictions, including the United
Kingdom, have recognized infringement exemptions for experimental use that are still
believed to protect most non-commercial academic research.90 In the aftermath of
Madey, some commentators have called for the U.S. Congress to enact a broad patent
immunity for research and experimental activity.91 To date, Congress has acted only
incrementally by exempting from infringement experimentation conducted in furtherance
of regulatory submissions for drugs and veterinary products.92 A more general legislative
experimental use exemption does not currently appear to be on the horizon.93
In addition to non-U.S. institutions, state-sponsored colleges and universities
within the U.S., which are immune from suit in federal court under the Eleventh
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, cannot be sued for patent infringement.
Accordingly, state-operated research institutions such as the University of Michigan, the
University of Wisconsin-Madison, the University of Florida and the entire University of
California system, each of which apply for and are awarded large numbers of patents
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every year, are themselves immune from patent infringement claims under current
Supreme Court interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment.94 While there have been calls
to eliminate this apparent windfall to state universities,95 such legislative proposals have
not yet been successful. It is thus private U.S. universities that bear the brunt of the
limited experimental use exemption.
4.1.3

Preserving Research Use Through Contract. Given the limited

scope of the experimental use exemption, private universities in the U.S. must conduct
their research activities in the shadow of potential patent infringement. While there is
evidence that many academic scientists ignore or are unaware of potential patent risks,96
evidence also suggests that potential patent claims may deter research in certain areas.97
If nothing else, university TLOs and legal offices have become significantly more aware
of potential infringement issues. According to one report, the University of Iowa, in
attempting to clear the research being conducted at a single laboratory studying rare
ocular disorders, unearthed 71 different entities of concern and spent $24,000 on
background checks and queries to patent holders.98
Absent a change in the judicial interpretation of the experimental use exemption,
universities are likely exposed to some level of risk from infringement of third party
patents. Such exposure may be unavoidable for the university that wishes to conduct
research at the cutting edge of science. What is avoidable, however, is the risk that
universities face from the patents on their own inventions. There have been recent
examples of universities that, whether through inadvertence or carelessness, licensed
inventions for exclusive use by industrial partners, thereby blocking any further use or
development by the university laboratory that originated them.99
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To avoid such situations, most universities now require standard language in all
license agreements that reserve the university’s right to exploit licensed inventions for
their own non-commercial research and educational purposes.100 In 2007, a group of
major research universities together with the Association of American Medical Colleges
(AAMC) released a document setting forth nine principles relevant to the licensing of
academic technology “in the public interest and for society’s benefit” (the “Nine Points
Document”).101 The first of these principles calls for universities not only to retain
through their licensing agreements the right to practice licensed inventions, but also to
extend such rights to any other non-profit or governmental organization.102 The Nine
Points Document goes so far as to suggest that even research sponsored by commercial
entities should be permitted, so long as it is conducted by a non-profit entity. Ordinarily,
such a reservation of rights would benefit a third party university only if the licensing
university granted it a license under the relevant patents. However, the Nine Points
Document, which has now been endorsed by over 70 universities, also suggests an
approach whereby any industrial licensee would contractually agree not to enforce a
licensed patent against any university or other non-profit institution.103 Additionally,
some funding organizations such as the NIH and the California Institute for Regenerative
Medicine, are encouraging the creation of contractually-based research exemptions for
non-commercial research.104 Should such contractual language be adopted widely by
universities, a broad, contractually-constructed experimental use exemption could emerge
where Congress has failed to recognize one.
4.2

Publication and Data Release. While university administrators and

technology transfer officers may be increasingly concerned with maximizing licensing

20

and royalty revenue for their institutions, the currency of academic researchers is, and
always has been, publication. The quantity and quality of a scientist’s publications has
been among the most important factors used in assessing the quality of his or her
research, advancing his or her career, and determining his or her stature within the
scientific community.105 It is not surprising, then, that most university licensing and
sponsored research agreements expressly reserve the right of university researchers to
publish the results of their work in scholarly or scientific journals. If the work is being
performed on behalf of a corporate sponsor or is likely to contain trade secrets of an
industrial collaborator, it is not unusual for the agreement to require the university to
provide a draft of any publication to the sponsor or collaborator in advance of
publication, and to allow a period (usually 30-60 days) during which the sponsor or
collaborator may suggest changes to preserve the ability to file patent applications and/or
to redact trade secrets and confidential information.
A scientific publication typically includes a brief presentation of significant
experimental findings, often made in summary or tabular fashion, together with the
scientist’s analysis and conclusions based upon those findings.106 While the published
data are usually essential to support the scientist’s analysis, the data reported in a journal
article seldom represent the entirety of the “raw” data collected or observed by the
scientist, and are typically only a small fraction of the full data set. Over the past decade,
however, an increasing number of scientific journals have required that authors make the
data supporting their published claims available to readers upon request.107 In certain
fields such as genomics, government funding agencies routinely require the deposit of
raw data sets into public databases,108 and there are numerous initiatives to encourage the
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sharing of observational and experimental data in the atmospheric and climatological
sciences.109 It is likely that this trend toward broad sharing of, and public access to,
scientific data concerning climate change will continue through a combination of journal
requirements, funding obligations and academic agreements.
4.3

Socially Responsible Licensing. For the past decade there has been

mounting public pressure to expand the availability of patented technologies, particularly
so-called “essential medicines”, in the developing world. When the HIV anti-retroviral
drug Zerit®, developed and patented by researchers at Yale University, became a critical
part of the standard AIDS treatment regimen, Yale students and faculty, together with the
popular press, exerted sufficient pressure on the university’s exclusive licensee BristolMyers Squibb (BMS) to persuade the company in 2001 to make the drug available at
nominal cost to AIDS sufferers in Africa.110 Since the Zerit® episode, an increasing
number of universities have declared their support for such humanitarian or “socially
responsible” licensing.111 The 2007 Nine Points Document refers explicitly to the
university’s “social compact with society” and urges universities to structure their
licensing arrangements so as to ensure that underprivileged populations have access to
medical innovations.112 In 2009 a group of six major research universities endorsed an
even stronger statement committing that their intellectual property would not “become a
barrier to essential health-related technologies needed by patients in developing
countries.”113
While current university initiatives have focused on access to essential medicines,
commentators have suggested that similar considerations should also apply with respect
to climate change technologies, which are also likely to have a profound effect on human
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health and welfare, both in the developed and the developing world.114 Certainly the
public debate over international intellectual property policy and climate change
technology echo the earlier (and ongoing) debate regarding access to essential medicines
in developing countries.115 Thus, it is likely that considerations of socially-responsible
licensing will enter into university sponsored research and licensing agreements for
climate change technologies in the not-too-distant future.
Potential licensing structures that might emerge, as suggested by the experience of
essential medicines, include (a) excluding developing countries from exclusive license
grants, (b) requiring licensees to grant sublicenses to local producers in developing
countries, (c) retaining university private march-in rights if products are not made
suitably accessible in developing countries, and (d) prohibiting the filing of
corresponding patent applications in developing countries.116 Other contractual
approaches that may achieve socially-responsible goals include university patent pledges
and non-assertion covenants such as those expressed in the Eco-Patent Commons
(described in Section 2.6 above), as well as the contribution of patents to sociallyoriented patent pools along the lines of the newly-formed UNITAID pool for essential
medicines.117

5

Conclusion
Research universities have traditionally been catalysts for technological

innovation and are likely to generate significant advances in climate change technology
for decades to come. However, unlike commercial enterprises, universities are subject to
significant limitations and obligations arising from federal funding requirements,

23

statutory regimes such as the Bayh-Dole Act, and the dictates of their non-profit charters.
It is important to keep these particular characteristics of universities and university
research in mind when considering any collaboration, license or sponsorship arrangement
with them. If appropriate consideration is given to these characteristics, however,
substantial benefits may be derived for industry, academia and society as a whole.
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